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ANOTHER OTHER:
THE REFUGEE

ON FINDING THE MISSING
LINK IN THE EVOLUTION OF
THE HUMAN ZOO



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these people [refugees] [...] were no longer [...] considered and hardly pretended to be active enemies [...] but they were and appeared to be nothing but human beings whose very innocence from every point of view, and especially that of the persecuting government was their greatest misfortune.

(Arendt 1994 294, f.)

Refugees are the price humanity is paying for the global economy.

(Zizek n.p.)

As children we are exposed to stories about ghosts; stories about strange beings residing on the threshold between life and death. These stories fascinate us; we are instantly drawn in by the marvellously strange and uncanny world they create. At the same time, however, we fear that this 'other-world' is not entirely shut off from the 'real world'. We fear that this imagined world might encroach upon ours and that its impalpable inhabitants

might harm us. It is not the factual ghosts that haunt us but the stories creating the ghosts. Departing from this thought, the present paper will argue that *Exhibit B*¹ uses the human zoo format as an intertext to link the colonial past to the current political situation by connecting ‘the colonial’ subject with ‘the refugee’: quite literally both of them are ghosts – they once were human, but they are not quite human anymore. They are not quite here nor quite there; they are the uncanny on the threshold between life and death, between “bios” and “zoē”, caught in a “zone of indistinction” (Agamben 1998 12, 19, 109)². Like ghosts, the Other/ the refugee haunts us because he is potentially dangerous – yet, just like our fear of ghosts this threat lacks substance and is seldom really tangible; it is first created by the stories we hear and the predominant narratives we are exposed to. While it has often been claimed that *Exhibit B* is ‘the human zoo back on stage’, the renaissance of a colonial repressed, the revival of ghosts from a colonial past presumed dead long ago, this article will argue that *Exhibit B* rather illustrates that these ghosts have never been dead; this colonial past has never been over; the human zoo has never really vanished. It will illustrate that the structural analogy between the human zoo format and *Exhibit B* enables us to look behind the magic lantern creating this ‘other-world’ and its inhabitants. The notion of the Other, the zone of indistinction, and the human zoo format as represented in *Exhibit B*: these are the three intricately interwoven

threads I engage with in my paper. The first part introduces the human zoo, explains the imaginary creation of the Other, and illustrates the necessity of the resulting – and indeed very real – binary opposition between ‘them’ and ‘us’ for hegemonic control (cf. Said; Foucault; Böetsch and Blanchard). It will be argued that the Other is an intertextual invention (fathered by colonial narratives) that threatens European hegemony and hence has to be controlled. Hence, the human zoo is a cardinal means to corroborate European economic predominance, cultural superiority, and racial fixity (cf. Hodeir 2014; Dreesbach 2012; Zedelmaier 2007; Grewe 2006). The second part examines the two core mechanisms that make formats like the human zoo work: identity formation *ex-negativo*, via *hermeneutic exclusion*, and the supposed unidirectionality of the gaze serve to separate, discipline, and exert power over the Other, thus re-establishing cracked boundaries in order to control the colonizer’s own population. The third part revolves around Brett Bailey’s *Exhibit B* that absorbs and transforms these exact mechanisms, thereby challenging the very fundament of its intertext (cf. Kristeva 1980, 66). The manipulation of the relationship between ‘object’ and audience creates a productive “zone of indistinction” (Agamben 1998, 109); a void, homogeneous space that questions the sovereign differentiation between the ‘self’ and the ‘Other’, thus quite literally turning the “eye of power” (Bhabha 1994, 160) back upon itself. The inclusion of ‘the refugee’ as

one of Bailey's *tableaux vivants* extends the trajectory of this colonial discourse to present day politics. This double bind of intertextuality that ties the past to the present and vice versa results in Arendt's argument that the unique characteristic of the modern refugee is his fundamental innocence: he is the 'leftover' of what has formerly been excluded by the colonial world – he is the colonial Other come back to life: a 'ghostified' human being whose only reality is the part he plays in the economic equation of globalization; he is "the price humanity is paying for the global economy" (Zizek n.p.) – mass-migration has always been part of human history, but in modernity, it is mainly the result of capitalist politics and colonial expansion. As will be shown, Brett Bailey's *Exhibit B* thus provides the concrete for a palimpsestic construction that binds together early (colonialist) representations of the Other and the latest 'product' of the global economy by laying bare the space both of these processes of Othering rely on in order to take effect: the "zone of indistinction" (Agamben 1998, 109), the sovereign-declared threshold between "bios" and "zoē" (ibid. 12, 19). *Exhibit B* hence illustrates that the cage as materialization of such a zone of indistinction has morphed into various forms and shapes, thus intricately connecting the colonial Other and the refugee by marking them as 'bare life', as non-political beings without the right to have rights. The cage becomes visible in the ocean that asylum-seekers drown in. It becomes tangible in

refugee shelters that are set on fire, in so-called transit zones in which 'normal' laws no longer apply, and in means of transportation used to deport stateless people in inhuman conditions. This paper hence argues that 'the refugee' is the biopolitical product of a continuously progressing process of othering driven by the urge for infinite economic progress; s/he is the result of predominant colonial narratives and economic structures, an uncivilized and potentially dangerous human being that is incompatible with 'our' norms and values; s/he is a modern *homo sacer*³ dwelling in ever-changing zones of indistinction – he is another Other.

Human exhibitions were a powerful instrument to create, reproduce, establish, and circulate the notion of the Other. By intertextually inscribing colonial narratives on the body of the 'Other' exhibited in the human zoo, these narratives are converted into 'reality' through this body. Hence, the physical body of the Other is used as the site that transforms theory into praxis. The exhibited 'objects' are the bodily incarnation, the materialization of Orientalism. Böetsch and Blanchard correctly explain that "the human exhibition was a way of objectifying and inscribing the Other in a hierarchy" (2014, 189) - the act of inscription as an act of writing visibly illustrates Said's analysis that "every writer on the Orient [...] assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies" (1977, 20). The Orient therefore "is

not an inert fact of nature” (ibid. 4) but a sort of stereotypical, intertextual Western product because it is imbued in “a tradition of [Western] thought, imagery, and vocabulary” (ibid. 5, also cf. Bhabha 1994, 153). This thought, this imagery, this notion of the ‘Other’ and the Orient is hence “constructed as a mosaic of quotations” (Kristeva 1986, 37) - it is not based on an empirical reality. The exhibition of a black man in a cage, performing ‘ritual dances’ with a ‘traditional’ weapon in his hands therefore is not the visual expression of an irrefutable truth – it is rather the strange product of an intertextual process that establishes an intimate relationship with earlier signifying elements, such as colonial “desires, repressions, investments, and projections” (Said 1977, 8) that define and constantly confirm what is deemed to be Oriental.

The installation of human zoos—being highly influenced by this complex psychological reflex of the European colonizers—and the spectators’ gaze—being highly influenced by their expectations, scientific assumptions, and the general ideology of their time—hence constantly confirm and maintain the essentialist division of the world. The apparently direct witnessing of the Other in human zoos therefore ostensibly provides evidence for the existence of racial and cultural hierarchies (cf. Maier 2012, 151). This “immediacy [however] ... obscures the fact that the audience is watching an highly artificial enactment of what a

non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient” (Said 1977, 21): the materials and requisites used to build huts are imported goods from the natives’ homeland, but their architectural design is a deviant reproduction of a supposedly original construction (cf. Grewe 2006, 14, f.). The acclaimed authenticity of this re-presentation of the Other is thus instantly problematized because the Orient is illustrated as a palimpsest built on the unchallenged unidirectional gaze of the Western colonizer and his *materialized* ‘white’ narratives. This observation clearly shows that Orientalism is not simply an ethereal European illusion, but a “created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment” (Said 1977, 7). The material exhibition of exotic ‘sub-humans’ thus profoundly contributes to the maintenance of the invented Other; Orientalism is confirmed to be an authoritative system that, in constituting knowledge as truthful, invigorates the supremacist European body (cf. Ludden 1993, 265; Couttenier 2014, 108, f.). The aforementioned psychological reflex then is no longer reserved for the colonizer, but it begins to take over the spectator; the authoritative system (that is Orientalism), becomes both definite reason and alleged remedy for a pathological condition that—just like every other intertextual product—questions (or even defies) spatial and temporal boundaries (Kristeva 1986 37): it comes to be a permanent state of paranoia because the author of the Orient—that is

European hegemony—at once is forced and threatened to “lose his structure and that of the world in the structure of language” (Barthes 1993, 145); instead of neutralizing and deconstructing what is ‘true’ and what is ‘false’, which according to Barthes is the ultimate goal of language, the Western individual uses the structure of language to constitute *praxis* and thereby “loses all claim to truth” (ibid.)⁴. In a structure that resembles Barthes’ topos of the death of the author, European hegemony comes under the threat of losing its authorial position⁵. Therefore, the Orient is to be controlled by the West. Yet, the essentialist position the Western individual assumes in this attempt of controlling the Other merely constitutes “an ambiguous product of the real” (ibid.). Due to its epistemological sovereignty, the repetitive stereotypical representation of the Other consequently reconstitutes this fragile order by operationalizing the language of ‘the writers on the Orient’, thus constituting an alternate reality.

Dividing this meta-analysis up into its parts, two intricately entangled key processes can be identified in relation to the constitution and the behaviour of the spectators. First, in an *ex-negativo* movement, the notion of the Other that is not-me triggers off the idea of who I actually am, thus restructuring my fractured self. Second, this psychological process involves a socio-political one: the panoptic uni-directionality of the gaze, designed to maintain this newly structured order. The view (*voir*) of an ‘animal-like’ black man, parading

in a cage with a ‘primordial’ weapon, reiterates “European superiority over Oriental backwardness” (Said 1977, 8). The Other then is “something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual)” (ibid. 40), and it is “something one studies and depicts (as in a curriculum)” (ibid.) in order to gain and spread knowledge (*savoir*). Consequently, the control and the circulation of this unchallenged knowledge is the nexus of European strength and power (*pouvoir*). The fear of losing the self (the author’s fear of death) is overcome by detachment via the gaze; it is overcome by setting the self off against the Other. Consequently, whenever “the whites confronted the “other”, they confronted themselves” (Maier 2012, 202): as if he were looking into a Foucauldian mirror when looking at the ‘objects’, the spectator sees himself where he is not, and thus begins to reconstitute himself⁶. The process of watching ‘freak shows’ is thus to be identified as a ‘reversed mirror stage’⁷: in a scopophilic manner, the spectator looks at the Other (who impersonates his mirror image) and perceives a strikingly similar shape and all the usual features, but at the same time he realizes that the Other ought to be what he himself is not (savage, lazy, lewd, superstitious), and he answers with disavowal⁸. This recognition ultimately sparks the idea of what he actually is: not what he perceives—ego-formation via the gaze as a process of abjection, ego-formation *ex-negativo*.

Yet, this process can only take effect because of the manipulation of the egalitarian 'see-being-seen-dyad'. By denying the objects' humanity, the audience neglects the possibility of having their gaze returned. This pan-optic uni-directionality of the gaze consequently generates and maintains their power: in the "peripheral ring everyone [the Other] is seen without ever seeing, whereas in the central tower, everyone [the spectator] sees without ever being seen" (Foucault 1977, 202). The exhibited objects are always looked at in their cage, and they can never effectively return this gaze because by definition of the Occident, the peripheral ring is constructed as a space of subordination, a space containing 'non-humans' that cannot look back. Following Foucault, the connection between *voir*, *savoir*, and *pouvoir* consequently illustrates that perspectivism generates knowledge, and the constant repetition and reproduction of this knowledge generates power; power that manifests itself in the body of the 'objects' exhibited in human zoos. The uni-directional gaze hence generates an 'autho-real' position in producing unquestionable—albeit intrinsically ambivalent and neurotic—knowledge that restores an idea of fixity: the stereotype, the "anxious repetition" (McLeod 2000, 54) that is the most important strategy of fixity (Bhabha 1994, 94). By constantly being "in excess of what can empirically be proved or logically construed" (Bhabha 1983, 18), the stereotype is an ambivalent means to repress the fractured reality and to replace it with the

firm, fixed, and comforting “Western thought, imagery, and vocabulary” (Said 5). The stereotype is therefore to be seen as a sort of Freudian defence mechanism developed to resolve this precarious condition by restoring an idea of fixity; the symmetrical form of the cage, the unshakable dominance of the cage’s iron bars that contain every uncertainty and every potential threat illustrates this mechanism perfectly. Hence the construction of the Other as the ‘non-self’, as the antipode (of the West) that is savage, backward, and primitive in contrast to the self that is civilised, industrious, and cultured. These unchallenged essentialist ontological and epistemological binaries consequently define European discourse. The stereotype – as brought about and constantly enacted by the gaze – is the legitimization of the sovereign’s suspension of the law, of his action without sanction; it is the justification of placing the Other beyond the law, turning them into *homini sacri*, thus re-establishing the Western individual and social order and giving rise to modern politics: according to Agamben, “there is politics because man is the living being who, *in language*, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion” (1998, 8). Consequently, the human zoo assumed a crucial role in visualizing this language, circulating it and thus maintaining this essentialist position and the embedded power relations.

By visualizing this language of power in a ‘zone of indistinction’, *Exhibit B* – a controversially discussed art project by South-African artist Brett Bailey – transforms and undermines it. *Exhibit B* features ‘human installations’ that confront the viewer with the most appalling and horrible atrocities committed under colonial rule and the current debauching policies towards asylum-seekers and refugees⁹. As if Bailey’s extreme realism and the superficial similarity to the human zoo format are not enough, it is perhaps this unsettling connection that sparks disapproval and even triggers protests against the exhibition. Smith-Prei and Stehle (2016) explain that Bailey’s exhibition reproduces the racist display of black people, but that “it is not a disruption” (78) (cf. Hess 2013, 107). As Bailey is a white artist, it has also been argued that he cannot thematise subjects like slavery or colonial atrocities because white people were perpetrators of these acts and therefore are ineligible to represent (post-) colonial trauma (cf. Knox 2016, 2). Yet, as will be shown, the very point of Bailey’s artwork is not to represent; the Spivakian distinction between portray and proxy¹⁰ that collapses in formats like the human zoo is supposed to be restored by each and every individual spectator. In order to understand this point, however, it is necessary and fundamental to interpret *Exhibit B* as an intertextual product that can only exist in relation to the human zoo format. By transforming this format, *Exhibit B* uncovers the fact that the Other (that is the

colonial Other and the refugee) continues to be the expelled and excluded ambivalent product of a discursive antagonism based on the representation of stereotypes depicting the non-empirical deviance from the norm.

The transformative aspect of *Exhibit B* as an intertextual artwork lies within the manipulation of the relationship between text and reader (object and spectator) that undercuts pre-existing hierarchies and power relations. Following from the premise that Exhibit B can only be discussed in relation to the human zoo format is that the artwork has to be defined as a “text that is the absorption and transformation of another” (Kristeva 1980, 66). Just like the Other that has been identified as a ‘mosaic of quotations’ (Kristeva 1986, 36), Bailey’s installation is dependent on previous signifying elements: the human zoo and its colonial context. Yet to only consider this absorption of previous texts by arguing that Exhibit B is a simple reproduction of the human zoo format is to ignore the aspect of transformation in Kristeva’s definition. A closer investigation of the relationship between text and reader, object and audience, yields that the boundaries between the self and the Other dissolve, thus questioning hegemonic narratives of Western dominance and control. In a statement about the cancelling of the show in London, Bailey explained that

The listed components of each installation include spectators – it is only complete with an audience. The instal-

lation is not about the cultural or anatomical difference between the colonial subject and the spectator; it is about the relationship between the two. It is about looking and being looked at. Both performer and spectator are contained within the frame. (theguardian.com 2014 n.p.)

The spectator no longer looks at the Other from behind the iron bars, but he is drawn into the cage (cf. Knox 4). By bursting this differential frame that has been constitutive of the human zoo format, *Exhibit B* successfully undermines colonial hierarchies. The spectator's position is no longer that of the white European colonizer: at the beginning of the show, each spectator is assigned a number. Not unlike black slaves, who were branded with numbers as a sign of their status as property, the audience members are consumed by the artwork, 'contained within the frame'; their white European identity is taken away, and thus the 'object' that is looked at and the 'numerical object' that watches are equated – every notion of 'cultural or anatomical difference' is erased from the very beginning. By entering the room in which the 'found objects' are exhibited, the spectator transgresses a spatial boundary, ending up in a sort of void, homogenous space in which the rigid binaries between black and white, between Occident and Orient, between the self and the Other have dissolved. As the notion of the Other becomes an empty category, the notion of the self is severely questioned because there is nothing left for the individual to separate the self from—the mirror stage ceases to work

(Knox 2016, 3). Therefore, everything that is known to be different— everything that is known to be Oriental, everything that defines the Other and has formerly been excluded—is now included as part of the self. At the same time, however, the horrible things that are portrayed push the self farther away from what was known to be Oriental, from what was known to be the Other—and since the Other has been included in the self, the installations ultimately alienate the spectator from his own self, thus enabling him to observe himself from a distant vantage point. By manipulating the relationship between text and reader, *Exhibit B* hence successfully absorbs the mechanisms employed by the human zoo format and transforms them. It thereby creates a newly coded space that is void of previously existing hierarchies and thus enables the audience to observe and question themselves.

In this homogenous space the panopticon ceases to work; by returning the gaze, the ‘objects’ are ‘subjectified’ and cast the spectator into an ambivalent, hybrid space in between that allows him to analyse and reject predominant colonial narratives. While the spectator thinks he is simply watching inanimate subject matters, ‘still lifes’, the performers are instructed to ‘return the gaze’, to look back at the audience, thus questioning “who can gaze upon whom, when, and how” (Knox 3). As a consequence, the spectator is surprised by an unsuspected glance and watches himself being looked at because the fundamental ‘see-being-seen-dyad’ is

re-established (Foucault 1977, 202). The unidirectionality of the gaze that dominated the objects exhibited in the human zoo is turned into a multi-directionality, and thus the spectator becomes the object of the “purportedly invisible all-seeing and controlling surveillant eye” (Amad 2013, 51). Quite literally, the ‘subjectified’ object uses this “counter-gaze” (Bhabha 1994, 67) to turn the eye of power back upon itself (cf. *ibid.* 160). As a consequence, it is the spectator who is caught in an ambivalent position in-between. He becomes the “interstitial passage between fixed identifications” (Bhabha 1983, 5) as he is caught in a performative space of enunciation: in a space between the ‘familiarized object’ and the ‘othered self’, between the ‘subjectified object’ and the ‘objectified self’. The hybrid spectator thus seems to become the “terrifying exorbitant object of paranoid classifications” (Bhabha 1994, 162) that is the origin of disorder and unrest, the origin of the dislocation of colonial narratives and hegemonic knowledge. By returning the gaze, the Other therefore assumes the role of the spectator, thus turning him into a strange *mélange* of his own Other and his original self. This process allows the spectator to perceive, experience, understand, and disrupt hegemonic narratives and knowledges.

As for the exhibition itself, the very same process can be observed. *Exhibit B* does not have a definite beginning and a definite end; it is a “performance of

intertextuality that dismantle[s] temporal and spatial boundaries” (McQuillen 2013, 154). As such it has to be identified as a menacing *mélange* of past and presence, illustrating that the *same* mechanisms (gazing, othering, defining, dominating) work in all the different and seemingly irreconcilable texts (colonialism vs. nowadays politics, human zoos vs. Western humanitarian values); of texts that are simultaneously ‘there’ and ‘gone’. The most obvious example of this intertextuality is the case of Marcus Omofuma¹¹.

In extending the trajectory of colonial discourse to modern day politics, *Exhibit B* successfully illustrates that these mechanisms of sovereign othering led to the present refugee ‘crisis’ and are still intimately interwoven in the fabric of our way of thinking about the Other.



Illustration 1: Marcus Omofuma tied to his chair (Meersman n.p.). Permission obtained.

The connection is perfectly obvious: as illustrated in the tableau, ‘the refugee’ has been forced into the cage, he has become ‘another Other’. Albeit asylum-seekers have not actively been deported to Europe to serve as a tool for racist propaganda, colonialism, neo-colonialism, global capitalism, neo-liberal politics and Euro-American interventionism in Africa and the Near East have actively triggered the present ‘refugee crisis’. This is what leads Žižek to the conclusion that “refugees are the price humanity is paying for global economy” (n.p.). They seem to be the ones to get or to take what ‘even Europeans’ are lacking, and therefore they are just like the Other (cf. Hess 112). Asylum-seekers and refugees are defined through fear; they are the subjects of ‘fearism’, the fearsome Other—they present a threat to European norms and values, they endanger the economy, they are potential risks for security, and they threaten to liquidate the national (and European) notion of a comprehensive spatial theory. Like Orientalism, these fears are not based on an empirical reality but on a collectively spun intertextual narrative about ‘the refugee’ in binary opposition to the Western individual. As “fear is a director of both life and civilisation” (Subba 13) this (unconsciously) developed narrative consequently directly impacts European politics by asserting ‘power over life’: the performer in the above installation is strapped to the chair, his head loosely dangling on his left shoulder as if he were sleeping—yet, the tape covers almost his whole face

and most of his body, thus illustrating that no matter how free he would be in his dreams, in reality, he is *caught* in a spectrogram and *fixed* in a stereotype, thus turning him into a *binding* precedent for the making of a *homo sacer*. His facelessness adds to his inability to speak; due to his black clothes it almost seems as if he vanishes in the darkness that surrounds him – he is slowly dissolving, leaving behind everything that defines him as a human until nothing is left but one thing: his shoes. While he is still in the process of becoming a homo sacer, at the brink of losing his humanity, caught in his personal ‘zone of indistinction’, the pairs of empty shoes to his left and right illustrates the final product: Void. Emptiness. All-encompassing nothingness. The human in them is gone. The tableau represents this exact moment, the ‘moment in between’: Marcus Omofuma is caught between being a citizen and being stateless, and he is caught between being a human and being something else – the installation shows that human rights are nothing but civil rights after all. As a consequence, Marcus Omofuma is caught between being bios and zoe – it is this exact *moment*, the *never-ending* threat of the camp that is the “hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity” (Agamben 73). The fact that the artwork is a ‘real-life-still-life’ illustrates this temporal transition lucidly and turns the transitory ‘found object’ into a ‘statuesque’ monument. When Derek Walcott hence makes the colonizer in his *The Sea is History* ask “where are

your monuments, your battles, martyrs?” the answer no longer has to be that “the sea has locked them up”. They are no longer forgotten and voiceless on the bottom of the Middle Passage or the Mediterranean Sea. They are here, included in the artwork, silently shouting to the audience that they shall look intensely, that they shall not ignore that everyday refugees are at the brink of becoming bare life: “[n]ot every refugee in a refugee camp is a *homo sacer*, but every one of them is virtually exposed to the possibility of becoming one” (Geulen 24). Hence, the coalescence of self and other brought about by *Exhibit B* is the source of true solidarity¹²; it lays bare “those invisible walls and the associated privileges that still govern how racial and ethnic minorities are viewed” (Knox 8); it lays bare the mechanisms that give rise to right wing movements all over Europe; the mechanisms that prevent refugees from finding work or accessing education, health care, and accommodation. It lays bare the mechanisms that result in the demand for ‘more national security’, for so called ‘transit-zones’¹³, for detention camps, and ultimately for the juridical legitimization to passively let asylum-seekers drown in the ocean or to actively shoot refugees at the borders: it lays bare the mechanisms that enact the very principle of Foucault’s Biopolitics that “if you want to live, the Other must die” (*Society* 255). The case of Marcus Omofuma is but one example illustrating that statelessness quickly turns into bare life; by being bound to the chair he is being stripped

off his right to have rights. Thereby his case not only visualizes the potential fate of all other refugees – pre-figured by Hannah Arendt when she wrote that “history has forced the status of the outlaw” (*Refugees* 119) upon Jews and refugees alike – but illustrates the paradigm of modern capitalist politics. *Exhibit B*’s ‘zone of indistinction’ hence is a call for a common struggle against the materialist factors that brought ‘the Other’ and ‘the refugee’ into being in the first place.

NOTES

1. *Exhibit B* (2012) was a controversial art installation by South-African artist Brett Baily and his theatre group ‘Third World Bunfight’. They performed in several European cities such as Paris, Berlin, and Edinburgh until the show was cancelled in London in 2014. The installation featured tableaux vivants depicting atrocities committed under colonial rule and the predicaments of immigration. It forces the spectator to engage with the colonial past and re-evaluate the present political situation.

2. Agamben argues that the sovereign’s power to differentiate between bare life and qualified life, places him in a state of exception in which the differentiation of politics and nature collapses. At the same time, the person declared bare life is included in the political system solely based on his/ her exclusion: “Sovereign violence opens up a zone of indistinction between law

and nature, outside and inside, violence and law.” (Agamben HS 41)

3. According to Agamben, “Western politics first constitutes itself through exclusion ... of bare life” (HS 11) – or, in Arendt’s words, through the sovereign’s ability and decision to arbitrarily “kill the juridical person” (447) – thus declaring him/ her “homo sacer” (Agamben, HS 12, 47). Hence, ‘homo sacer’ is merely a human body without the “right to have rights” (Arendt 297); a disenfranchised and banned human being who can be killed with impunity.

4. In describing the relentless vigour of reclaiming authority as “classificatory mania” (197), Maier instantly problematizes this approach to a solution: precisely because of the attempt to classify every human being and every race, the European individual loses itself in a psychological condition in which every classification blurs and becomes non-existent; a condition in which fantasy and reality can no longer be divided – hence Barthes’ conclusion.

5. The death of the author is taken quite literally here; yet, as will be shown, it serves another (less programmatic) purpose: the idea is relevant in so far that it demonstrates that intertextuality challenges the dichotomy between interior and exterior, between (temporal) beginning and end; it challenges the notion that

a text has definite boundaries – it therefore not only applies to the (synchronic) social stratification but also to the (diachronic) reproduction of these hegemonic mechanisms and narratives. In the last part of this paper, Brett Bailey's Exhibit B will illustrate this thought more clearly.

6. This idea relies on Foucault's notion of the mirror as both a utopia and a heterotopia and proves to be quite fecund in relation to the human zoo. The mirror views myself in a place where I am not – it is a utopia. Yet, I see myself in this non-place, which renders my occupation of that place absolutely real, and I am able to come back to myself – it is a heterotopia. The Other as constructed by white Europeans is a utopia because it “enables me to see myself where I am not” (Other Spaces 24) – in the ‘savage’ who acts as my mirror image. Simultaneously, however, this mirror image does really exist (the spectator is looking at a real human being after all) where “it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy” (ibid.); he is becoming aware of the utopia, and in discovering the absence from what he is, he comes back to himself, reconstitutes himself (ibid.). As illustrated before, the real and the unreal clash and blend, supporting the psychasthenic or maniac analysis resulting from Barthes' observations; the Orient's author loses himself in a space without boundaries. (on which issues? Briefly mention.).

7. The spectator does not perceive the centre of his own perception for the first time as Lacan suggests (cf. 64). The process works quite the other way around: the spectator sees what he is not, thus defining what he actually is.

8. This term has been chosen here because it illustrates the irony of human zoos perfectly: disavowal is a Freudian term operating in the discourse of sexuality: the anatomical difference between man and woman reiterates the boy's fear of castration and makes the girl feel already inferior because supposedly she has already been castrated. Disavowal hence is a psychological defence mechanism resulting from uneasy sexual observations. Ergo, it appears as if the 'savages' are not really the ones with an excessive sexual drive.

9. As will be shown in the subsequent paragraphs, Knox correctly identifies this connection, but she does not follow through, thus failing to come to an adequate conclusion.

10. Spivak highlights two different modes of representation: in politics, most of the times, *Vertretung* is in connivance with *Darstellung*. While the first term refers to political representation (proxy) of a marginalized group of people, the second term means the portrayal of that people (portray). In formats like the human zoo, the representation of colonial subjects is a portrayal used as a political tool – the distinction col-

lapses. Bailey's artwork, however, brings Spivak's solution (the constant critique of any kind of representation) back into play.

11. Marcus Omofuma was a Nigerian refugee, who illegally entered Austria in 1998, but his application for political asylum was denied. When he refused to enter the plane, Austrian police forces bound him to his seat with adhesive tape, not sparing his mouth and covering most of his nose. As a consequence of this maltreatment, he suffocated during the flight.

12. Zizek is highly sceptical of certain modes of 'humanitarian solidarity' like sentimentalism or compassion. Yet, by claiming that empathy alone does not get to the root of the problem and can therefore be dispensed with, he betrays his own 'realistic' position: in the long term, empathy does not solve the problem, but refugees and asylum-seekers oftentimes are dependent on this idea of situational ethics because it provides material aid in a momentary condition of need.

13. The idea of transit-zones was introduced by the German government in 2015 as a solution to cope with 'the refugee crisis'. In terms of geopolitics, it is both extremely interesting and tremendously horrifying: transit-zones were supposed to be created 'in between borders', where the deportation of refugees would be much easier – de facto non-existing spaces to be built up out of nothing.

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